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CONSORTIUM ON NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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War and Reconciliation

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War and Reconciliation

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ABSTRACT: Reconciliation between countries following a war or a series of wars has attracted little scholarly attention as a phenomenon to be studied even though it receives journalistic coverage and past cases of reconciliation have been extensively described. This paper uses four international events datasets to explore whether reconciliation events have a discernible impact on the relations between countries, and if so, the nature of that impact. The paper describes the objectives of this project, the hypotheses tested, the data used, and the results obtained. The results suggest that reconciliation events have an impact, at least in some cases. However, limitations of the data constrain what can be asserted. The paper then discusses how to continue this research by linking to other research questions and theoretical schools and by focusing our next study on eight cases.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the writings of Hobbes and Locke, a fundamental political question is why individuals enter into, and how they maintain, civil society despite competition and conflict among individual actors. A variety of formal and informal work acknowledges the tension between aggressive behavior and societal harmony and points to the importance of *reconciliation*—returning to peace, harmony, or amicable relations after a conflict—as integral to mitigating future violence and maintaining societal stability.

Consider three recordings of the role of reconciliation in very disparate "societies." The first incident is described by ethologist Frans de Waal (de Waal, 1989, p. 5). He recalls witnessing a fight in the chimpanzee colony of the Arnhem Zoo:

It was the winter of 1975 and the colony was kept indoors. In the course of a charging display, the dominant male attacked a female, which caused screaming chaos as other chimpanzees came to her defense. When the group finally calmed down, an unusual silence followed, with nobody moving, as if the apes were waiting for something. Suddenly the entire colony burst out hooting, while one male worked the large metal drums in the corner of the hall. In the midst of the pandemonium I saw two chimpanzees kiss and embrace. . . the embracing individuals had been the same male and female of the initial fight.

A second observation comes from the seventeenth century letters of American author Samuel Sewall (Hendrickson, 1987, p. 90). He captured the following ceremony of native Americans of the northeast colonies in

1680:

Meeting with the Sachem they came to an agreement and buried two axes in the ground . . . which ceremony to them is more significant and binding than all the Articles of Peace, the hatchet being a principle weapon.

Three centuries later, contemporary historian Hendrick Smith described the signing of a peace treaty and the public joining of hands between President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel, and President Jimmy Carter of the United States (Smith, 1979, A1):

The elusive, unprecedented peace treaty that Egypt and Israel signed today has enormous symbolic importance and the potential for fundamentally transforming the map and history of the entire region . . . the best diplomatic estimate here is that the treaty has markedly reduced the risk of a major war in the Middle East for a considerable time . . .

Notably, each description contains the implicit or explicit hypothesis that future violence is less likely to occur, and "societal" order more likely to be maintained, if the parties to a conflict engage in a formal, public process of reconciliation. This is a powerful, yet untested assumption despite pervasive references to reconciliation in popular discussions of intra- and international conflicts.¹

This paper considers what effect, if any, the role reconciliation has at the level of "international society."² It asks, does public reconciliation between national belligerents reduce the outbreak of future conflict and lead to more amicable relations? If reconciliation matters in this context, can we refine our insight to say under what circumstances reconciliation is

more or less likely to occur and by what mechanisms reconciliation restores amicable relations between parties and impedes future conflicts?³

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The immediate research questions we wish to answer concerning how does a reconciliation event affect relations between former combatants are:

- Do relations between former combatants improve following the reconciliation event?
- Do relations between former combatants improve relative to their long-term relations before the conflict?
- When comparing across a number of post-conflict situations, do relations between former combatants that experience a reconciliation event subsequently exhibit less conflictual interactions than the subsequent (post-conflict) relations between former combatants that did not have a reconciliation event?
- Does the reconciliation event precede an improvement in relations or is it simply a stage in an already ongoing improvement?

As derived from analogous social science literature referred to earlier, we define a "reconciliation event" as one that typically includes the following elements: (1) direct physical contact or proximity between opponents, usually the senior representatives of the respective states; (2) a public ceremony accompanied by substantial publicity or media attention that relays the event to the wider national societies; and (3) ritualistic or symbolic behavior that indicates the parties consider the quarrel resolved

and that more amicable relations are expected to follow. Often the signing of a treaty incorporates these three elements, and, in practice, is the embodiment of a reconciliation.

HYPOTHESES TESTED

We intend to test the following hypotheses regarding the impact of reconciliation on international relations:

1. The relations between former combatants improve following a reconciliation event.
2. Relations between former combatants that have a reconciliation do *not* improve compared to their *long-term* relations before the conflict.
3. Those former belligerents that experience a reconciliation event subsequently exhibit better relations than those former belligerents that did not have a reconciliation event.
4. The reconciliation event is more than simply another step in improving relations. It is at minimum an inflection point at which the rate of change in the improvement of relations increases. In other cases it is an inflection point at which the nature of the relations changes from declining or essentially unchanging to improving.

Hypotheses 1 and 3 are straightforward given the research questions. Hypothesis 2 may seem unusual, but it is consistent with the theoretical proposition that reconciliation is an act to restore and, over the long term, maintain societal comity. We expect that reconciliation will not, in general, directly alter the long-term interests of the parties. For that reason we expect that relations following a reconciliation would at most only temporarily rise to a higher level than the long-term state of relations.

Hypothesis 4 also requires further explanation. We are positing that the reconciliation event can be recognized as a positive turning point in relations. This is a stronger hypothesis than hypothesis 1, which only asserts that relations improve following a reconciliation event. With hypothesis 1 a reconciliation event could simply be in the middle of a uniform trend towards better relations or could even be the point at which an improvement in relations slows down and the hypothesis would still be true.

PROCEDURE OF ANALYSIS AND DATA SOURCES USED

To test the hypotheses enumerated above, we combine three sets of information. The first is a catalogue of interstate wars from 1888 to 1991. The country dyads involved in these wars serve as the primary units of analysis. We obtained our list of wars and major participants—and thus dyads—from the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDS) dataset (version 2.10) that is available on the Internet at:

[http://www.polsci.binghamton.edu/peace\(s\)/mid_data.htm](http://www.polsci.binghamton.edu/peace(s)/mid_data.htm)

and whose nature is described in Gochman and Moaz (1984) and Gochman and Leng (1988). From that dataset we extracted a list consisting of 53 interstate wars. That list can be found in Appendix A. From that list we identified 114 country dyads for whom a reconciliation was—at least in principle—feasible. A listing of these dyads can be found in Appendix B. Dyad members had to have fought against each other in at least one war. In many instances dyad members had fought multiple wars in the time frame of the study.

We use the time period 1888 to 1991 to address time lags. The latter date is used because a war must have concluded before a reconciliation event becomes feasible and because our primary relationship datasets (discussed below) end in 1992. The time frame begins at 1888 because of

the combination of two factors. First, we need some upper limit in the time delay for what can reasonably be considered a reconciliation. That the participants need to be alive is a plausible criterion, and sixty years is a reasonable upper limit for participants in a war to still be in positions to make a reconciliation for their countries. Second, our relationship datasets begin at 1948; a sixty year delay puts us back to 1888.

The second set of information is reconciliation events. We sought to divide the 114 dyads into two groups, those that have experienced reconciliation following a war and those that have not. This categorization is necessary to test the hypotheses. Consequently, we assembled a dataset of reconciliation events between the countries in the dyads identified from the MIDS dataset. These data have been collected by the authors from historiographic study of each of the countries and their relationships with their dyadic "partners" subsequent to the wars between them. The list of reconciliation events is found in Appendix C. We then coded each dyad in Appendix B for reconciliation or its absence.

The third set of information is the status or condition over time of the relationship between the countries in the dyads. These are the relationship patterns referred to in the hypotheses. We obtained measures of these relationships from four sources. The first two are the COPDAB and WEIS datasets (Azar, 1980a; Azar, 1980b; Davies and McDaniel, 1994; Tomlinson, 1993; Tomlinson, 1996). Both of these datasets are well known and have been used for a number of studies. They store in chronological sequence the history of reported cooperative and hostile acts directed from individual countries to other individual countries. COPDAB covers the period 1948-1978, and WEIS covers the period 1966-1992. While the datasets differ in many significant ways, they are broadly similar in how they track the behavior of countries towards each other (Reuveny and Kang, 1996). With the advent of the Goldstein scale (1992) for the WEIS coding scheme, both datasets now have numeric values for each

event that are a measure of the degree of "cooperativeness" or "hostility" of the event. Thanks to the numeric scales, it is a straightforward matter to generate comparable time series plots for the relationships.

We accessed two additional, similar datasets to obtain data more recent than 1992. The Levant dataset (available at <http://www.ukans.edu/~keds/>) contains a chronology of dyadic, interstate events in the Middle East from April 1979 to February 1997 (at the time of this writing) condensed to their WEIS code values (Schrodt and Gerner, 1997). An ancillary datafile has those events summed for each month and converted to Goldstein scale values. We used the ancillary dataset. In addition, we received data from the PANDA dataset pertaining to a number of dyads for the period 1984 to 1995 (Bond and Bond, 1995). These data for all but a small subset of events had been coded to the Goldstein scale. One of the authors converted that subset manually; the decisions made regarding the coding of those events are available from the authors.

From these datasets we selected the flows pertaining to the conflict dyads that we identified from the MIDS dataset. In combination with the reconciliation events data, the time-series of these flows provide information with which we can determine whether a reconciliation event corresponded with a change in the relations between countries. Table 1 identifies which bilateral relationships are addressed by any of the four chronological events datasets *and* the reconciliation events dataset.

Table 1

<u>Dyad</u>	<u>End of Conflict</u>	
<u>Reconciliation Event</u>		
1) USSR-W. Germany	5/45	8/70
2) W. Germany-Poland	5/45	12/70
3) USA-Japan	8/45	4/52
4) Japan-UK	8/45	4/52
5) China-Japan	8/45	4/52
6) India-Japan	8/45	4/52
7) France-Japan	8/45	4/52
8) Australia-Japan	8/45	4/52
9) Greece-Japan	8/45	4/52
10) New Zealand-Japan	8/45	4/52
11) South Africa-Japan	8/45	4/52
12) India-China	11/62	12/88
13) Honduras-El Salvador	7/69	10/80
14) USA-Vietnam	1/73	7/95
15) Israel-Jordan	10/73	10/94
16) Egypt-Israel	10/73	9/78
17) Ethiopia-Somalia	3/78	4/88
18) Cambodia-Vietnam	1/79	10/91
19) Uganda-Tanzania	4/79	2/81
20) Vietnam-China	3/79	10/91
21) UK-Argentina	6/82	3/90

We originally intended to perform three different types of analysis to test our hypotheses. The first type is simple visual analysis. The procedure is to plot the relationships over time that had a reconciliation,

demarcate the time of the reconciliation on the plot, and visually inspect the plots to determine if the plots change as posited in hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. Plotting those relationships that did *not* have a reconciliation and comparing them with the first set of plots would allow for a visual interpretation of hypothesis 3.

METHOD FOR GENERATING VISUAL ANALYSIS

One of the authors wrote FORTRAN programs to extract the appropriate data from three of the events datasets to generate time-series plots. (The fourth dataset, the datafile ancillary to the Levant dataset already had the data in the form needed for analysis.) The programs accomplished effectively two tasks. The first program extracted from the datasets those events that were directed from one selected country to another, (for the WEIS dataset converted those events to numerical values using the Goldstein scale⁴), separately summed the numerical values for the cooperative and conflictual events for each month, and then calculated a monthly weighted net conflict (conflict minus cooperation) measure. The result of running this program would be a datafile containing the monthly cooperation, conflict, and net conflict "flows" from one country to another for those months for which there were any events from one of the countries to the other.

The second program "padded" the datafiles with zeros for those months for which there were no reported events so that the plots would be linear from the first month of recorded events within the datafile to the last month of recorded events.⁵ The padded datafiles were then imported into the JMP statistical analysis program on a Macintosh, and the time series were plotted. For those dyads for which we found a reconciliation event, a line was drawn on the plots demarcating the time of the event.

The resulting plots contain "spikes" that portray the level or intensity of cooperative, conflictual, and net conflictual interaction for each month for which interaction was reported. All figures used in this paper present plots of only the net conflict measure. The scale of the vertical axis of the figures is not as important as is any change in the nature of the spikes around the time of the reconciliation event.

LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA

Unfortunately, only a limited number of cases offered clear visual evidence of the impact of reconciliation. The temporal span or "window" of the relationship data (mostly 1948-1992 with a few instances up to 1995 or 1997) was, in many instances, "in the wrong place" to allow for accurate comparisons between pre- and post-conflict relations. Of the 21 reconciliation events in the period 1948-1995, nine occurred in 1951-52 (cases 3-11 in Table 1), and two occurred in 1994-95 (cases 14 and 15 in Table 1); periods effectively at the end of the time series plots. In these cases we found it impossible to determine whether there was a change in behavior between pre- and post-conflict periods because there were insufficient observations between 1948 and 1952 or after 1994 to provide a sound reference point for comparison. See Figure 1 (Japan-United Kingdom) for illustration. Furthermore, of the ten remaining cases, two (cases 17 and 19 in Table 1) had insufficient data to create a meaningful graphic representation of the relationship.⁶ See Figure 2 (Uganda-Tanzania) for illustration. Because of the limited number of workable cases, eight, we did not perform the second type of analysis, interrupted time series analysis, or the third type of analysis, analysis of variance.⁷

RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

We found through visual inspection of the eight workable reconciliation cases, five dyads where a reconciliation event signaled a subsequent improvement in bilateral relations (cases 1, 12, 16, 18, and 20 in Table 1). See Figures 3-7 (USSR-West Germany, India-China, Egypt-Israel, Cambodia-Vietnam, and Vietnam-China) for illustrations. The three remaining cases did not provide evidence that a reconciliation

had a positive impact. Figure 8 (United Kingdom-Argentina) serves as an example of this outcome.

On balance, these findings offer modest support for our first hypothesis, that is, at least in some instances, a reconciliation event appears to lead to improved relations between countries.

Likewise, our fourth hypothesis garners support from these graphs. In most cases the reconciliation event demonstrates that it is a meaningful event by marking an inflection point in the plots and thereby signaling a change in the dynamics of the relations between the countries. The results are not sufficient to make conclusions regarding our second hypotheses because the number of positive examples are too few. Hypothesis number three cannot be addressed because the subsample of usable reconciled cases is too small to be meaningfully compared with non-reconciled cases.

As a result of these findings, we believe that the effects of reconciliation on international relations remains an open question worthy of further investigation. The concluding section of this article offers one possible approach to exploring what factors give rise to a reconciliation event and why reconciliation leads to an improvement in subsequent bilateral relations in some cases.

THOUGHTS ON FURTHER INVESTIGATION

The results of our "large n" study have accomplished two things: (1) provided enticing but inconclusive support for the suggestion that reconciliation may lead to an improvement in relations between former national belligerents; and, (2) given us a set of cases with some apparent variance on the dependent variable: subsequent bilateral relations between the former belligerents. We propose, therefore, a comparative case study of the eight instances of reconciled conflicts that appear to confirm or disconfirm our first hypothesis to explore two questions: (1) what factors

are likely to give rise to a reconciliation event; and, (2) when and why does reconciliation improve subsequent bilateral relations.

An in-depth study of a small number of cases would provide certain opportunities to explore these questions and present certain methodological challenges. The major challenge, of course, is the problem of complex, multiple determinants of social phenomenon and spurious or invalid inferences drawn from a few cases where multiple causal factors may be at play—in short, the problem of "over-determinancy." To control for this problem, the case study investigation will be narrowed by the systematic use of theories and a within-case process tracing procedure. General hypotheses used to explain the factors that give rise to reconciliation and the reasons for reconciliation's beneficial impact on subsequent bilateral relations will be drawn from relevant literature in the social sciences and become the bases for structured comparisons between cases. Having used theory to establish the relevant independent variables, within-case process tracing will attempt to identify the intervening steps or cause-and-effect links between the independent variables and the outcome of the dependent variable (George, 1982). The controlled comparative method has certain distinct advantages as well: the problem of reliability and validity may be smaller than in large N studies because the analyst has a small number of cases to thoroughly consider and is less dependent on data s/he cannot properly evaluate (Lijphart, 1975).

Specifically, the literature on negotiated ends to civil conflict offers hypotheses that might be applied in an international context to identify the factors that invite reconciliation events. A phenomenon quite similar to reconciliation between countries is reconciliation *within* countries following a civil war. For example, terms such as 'government of national reconciliation' or 'government of national unity' have been used by political leaders to describe their efforts (at least ostensibly) to bring in all major political groups in order to heal the wounds of war. Recent

examples of these governments include South Africa, Nicaragua, Tajikistan, and Angola.

William Zartman argues that negotiated endings to civil conflict occur when there is a symmetry of power between the combatants such that the conflict has evolved into a mutually hurting stalemate, that is, neither side perceives that it can achieve its original desired outcome. A second condition for negotiated solutions is that the stalemate is not a comfortable place for either side. Both sides fear continued violence, and thus a continuation of the violence is not acceptable. In the jargon of systems analysis, the stalemate is an unstable equilibrium because both sides do not want to remain there, and one way out is to negotiate a settlement (Zartman, 1995a). Finally, he maintains that a negotiated settlement is more likely if both participants possess sufficient power and legitimacy to satisfy the minimum demands of their supporters (Zartman, 1995b). If they lack this capacity, any agreement, even if reached, is unlikely to endure. Extrapolating from civil conflicts to international conflicts, this study will consider whether these alleged preconditions for constructive rapprochement within nations also are those that accompany international reconciliations.

Two very different theoretical traditions generate hypotheses that respond to the question: "Why does reconciliation lead to an improvement in bilateral relations?" The first hypothesis derives from rational choice and game theoretic approaches to explaining cooperative outcomes. This approach stresses that the best strategy for breaking a pattern of hostile interactions is through the sending of signals that provide a measure of commitment to the pursuit of improved relations (Armstrong, 1993; Komorita, 1973; Swinth, 1967). Reconciliation events or gestures are particularly effective form of this type of signal because reconciliation is costly to the participants and *costly* signals are more reliable determinants of a state's true intentions.

Reconciliation events impose costs because of their "audience effect" (Fearon, 1990). Leaders do not conduct foreign policy in isolation, but before domestic and international audiences. Concern with adverse domestic political reaction to a reconciliation event with a former adversary or with domestic political humiliation should a leader decide to subsequently back down from an agreement are important domestic audience costs associated with a reconciliation attempt. Likewise, risking opprobrium from third states that may disapprove of the reconciliation or loss of international reputation should the party to a reconciliation event retreat from the agreement also imposes significant international audience costs associated with a reconciliation attempt. In sum, a reconciliation event is a costly signal that the other party is more likely to interpret as a genuine offer to improve relations and thus may break a deadlocked conflictual situation. Because of the associated costs of backing away from the reconciliation, it may also buttress initial attempts of the parties at cooperative interaction.

The case of the India-China reconciliation may illustrate some of these points. The decision by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to visit China in December 1988 risked his standing in domestic public opinion and created a vulnerability in his subsequent relations with the Chinese. Likewise, China's decision to receive the visit and conduct a public reconciliation with Gandhi proved costly to its entente with Pakistan and constrained China's subsequent freedom in negotiations with India over issues in the bilateral relationship (Garver, 1996).

Philosophical, psychological, and legal treatments of reconciliation offer an alternative hypothesis. These approaches argue that important social practices are direct outgrowths—in institutional form—of deep human passions or emotions (Murphy and Hampton, 1988) not merely rational calculations. Reconciliation events, therefore, are evidence of "forgiveness"—the process of overcoming certain psychological attitudes

(mainly the overcoming of various forms of anger or resentment). More positively, they represent a change of heart toward a formerly perceived wrongdoer that opens the possibility of new beneficial relations.

Forgiveness is not the condoning of the former belligerent's action; it is a revision in judgment of the former belligerent itself. The parties to a reconciliation come to understand themselves as something other than those incidents or traits which they do not approve.

According to this hypothesis, although cognitive judgments and strategy may be involved in the process of reconciliation, the process of reconciliation also represents the overcoming of collective emotions. Reconciliation requires: (1) regaining one's confidence in one's own worth despite the actions (aggression) that may have challenged it; and, (2) the repudiation of emotions of resentment toward the other and the willingness to see the other as someone other than "the one that hurt me" (Murphy and Hampton, 1988, p. 34).

CONCLUSION

Reconciliation is a pervasive and possibly important factor in understanding international and national politics. It has been, for example, integral to the experience of the United States. President Lincoln made it the basis for a strong federal state in his famous and eloquent Second Inaugural Address in 1865 when he declared a reconciliation with the Confederacy "with malice toward none, with charity for all." President Truman, likewise made it a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy after World War II in America's relations with Germany and Japan.

Reconciliation, however, has yet to assume a role in scholarly thinking about international politics. Perhaps because of the more traditional focus on generalizable circumstances associated with war, much less attention has been devoted to the factors that establish a successful rapprochement

between former belligerents such as reconciliation.

This article opens the door to thinking about reconciliation in world politics and offers a portrait of the impact of reconciliation that suggests it may be an important factor in improving relations between former belligerents. This finding recommends further investigation of the factors that give rise to reconciliation in international politics and a theoretically-informed search for the mechanism by which reconciliation leads to a subsequent improvement in bilateral relations. Finally, this study hopes to encourage other research that explores the ubiquitous, but seldom analyzed, political phenomenon of reconciliation.

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APPENDIX A

Interstate Wars 1888-1991 from MIDS Dataset

This file contains the interstate wars that were fought in the time period relevant to our events dataset, which runs from 1948 to 1992, and the participants of those wars as catalogued by the MIDS dataset. The time period is 1888 to 1991, the latter date because the war has to have concluded before a reconciliation event, and 1888 because we need some upper limit for what can reasonably be considered a reconciliation. The participants need to still be alive is a plausible criterion, and sixty years is a reasonable upper limit for participants in a war to still be in positions to make a reconciliation for their countries.

1. France/Thailand of 1893

- France
- Thailand

2. Sino-Japanese War (1894-95)

- China
- Japan

3. Greco-Turkish War of 1897
(1896-97)

- Turkey
- Greece

4. Spanish-American War (1898)

- USA
- Spain

5. Boxer Rebellion (1900)

- China
- USA

- United Kingdom
- Japan
- France
- Russia

6. Occupation of Manchuria (1900)

- Russia
- China

7. Russo-Japanese War (1903-05)

- Russia
- Japan

8. Second Central American War
(1906)

- Guatemala
- Honduras
- El Salvador

9. Third Central American War
(1907)

- Honduras
- Nicaragua
- El Salvador

10. Spanish-Moroccan War of 1909
(1909-10)

- Spain
- Morocco

11. Italian-Turkish War (1911)

- Italy
- Turkey

12. First Balkan War (1912-13)

- Bulgaria
- Greece
- Turkey
- Yugoslavia

13. Second Balkan War (1913)

- Turkey
- Yugoslavia
- Bulgaria
- Greece

- Romania

14. World War I (1914-18)

- USA
- United Kingdom
- Germany
- France
- Romania
- Turkey
- Greece
- Austria-Hungary
- Belgium
- Russia
- Bulgaria
- Italy
- Yugoslavia
- Portugal
- Japan

15. Hungary vs. Allies War (1919)

- Hungary
- Romania
- Czechoslovakia

16. Russo-Polish War (1919-20)

- Soviet Union
- Poland

17. French Occupation of Cilicia (1919-21)

- France
- Turkey

18. Greek-Turkish War (1919-22)

- Greece
- Turkey

19. Lithuanian War of Independence (1920)

- Poland
- Lithuania

20. China Eastern Railway Dispute (1929)

- China

- Soviet Union

21. Manchurian War (1931-33)

- China
- Japan

22. Chaco War (1931-35)

- Bolivia
- Paraguay

23. Italy/Ethiopia (1934-36)

- Italy
- Ethiopia

24. Marco Polo bridge (1937-41)

- China
- Japan

25. Chankufeng War (1938)

- Soviet Union
- Japan

26. Nomohan War (1939)

- Japan
- Mongolia

27. Russo-Finish War (1939-40)

- Soviet Union
- Finland

28. World War II (1939-45)

- USA
- United Kingdom
- France
- Germany
- Soviet Union
- Japan
- Poland
- Italy
- Belgium
- Norway
- Finland
- Hungary
- Bulgaria
- Romania

- Greece
- Netherlands
- Yugoslavia
- China
- Brazil
- Ethiopia
- Canada
- South Africa
- Australia
- New Zealand
- Mongolia

29. France-Thai War (1940-41)

- France
- Thailand

30. First Kashmir War (1947-49)

- India
- Pakistan

31. Palestine War (1948)

- Egypt
- Iraq
- Isreal
- Jordan
- Lebanon
- Syria

32. Korean War (1950-53)

- North Korea
- South Korea
- USA
- China
- United Kingdom
- Canada
- Netherlands
- France
- Phillipines
- Greece
- Belgium
- Australia
- New Zealand
- Thailand
- Colombia
- Turkey

- Ethiopia

33. Sinai War (1956)

- Isreal
- Egypt
- United Kingdom
- France

34. Hungarian Revolution (1956)

- Hungary
- Soviet Union

35. Sino-Indian War (1961-62)

- China
- India

36. Vietnam War (1964-1975)

- USA
- South Vietnam
- North Vietnam
- Thailand
- Philippines
- Cambodia
- South Korea
- Australia
- Laos

37. Second Kashmir War (1965)

- India
- Pakistan

38. Six Day War (1967)

- Isreal
- Egypt
- Jordan
- Syria

39. War of Attrition (1967-70)

- Egypt
- Isreal

40. Football War (1969)

- Honduras
- El Salvador

- 41. Bangladesh War (1971)
 - Pakistan
 - India
- 42. Yom Kippur War (1971-73)
 - Isreal
 - Jordan
 - Egypt
 - Saudi Arabia
 - Syria
 - Iraq
- 43. Cyprus War (1974)
 - Turkey
 - Cyprus
- 44. Vietnamese-Cambodian War (1975-79)
 - Vietnam
 - Cambodia
- 45. Ethiopian-Somalian Ogaden War (1977-78)
 - Ethiopia
 - Somalia
 - Cuba
- 46. Ugandan-Tanzanian War (1978-79)
 - Uganda
 - Tanzania
 - Libya
- 47. Sino-Vietnam War (1978-79)
 - China
 - Vietnam
- 48. Unnamed conflict between Isreal and Syria in 1980-82 (1980-82)
 - Syria
 - Israel
- 49. Iran-Iraq War (1980-88)
 - Iran
 - Iraq
- 50. Falklands Islands War (1982)
 - United Kingdom
 - Argentina
- 51. Second Sino-Vietnamese War (1986-87)
 - China
 - Vietnam
- 52. Persian Gulf War (1990-91)
 - USA
 - United Kingdom
 - Syria
 - Saudi Arabia
 - Canada
 - Egypt
 - France
 - Italy
 - Iraq
- 53. Armenia-Azerbaijani War over Nagorno-Karabakh (1991-94)
 - Armenia
 - Azerbaijan

APPENDIX B

Conflict Dyads 1888-1991

This appendix contains the country dyads whose members have fought at least one war against each other in the time period relevant to the events dataset. These dyads thus delimit the relationships in which we look for reconciliation events.

1. United States vs Spain
 - Spanish American war in 1898
2. United States vs China
 - Boxer Rebellion in 1900
 - Korean War
3. United States vs Soviet Union/Russia
 - occupation in 1918-19
4. United States vs Germany
 - WW1
 - WW2
5. United States vs Japan
 - WW2
6. United States vs Italy
 - WW2
7. United States vs North Korea
 - Korean War
8. United States vs North Vietnam
 - Vietnam War
9. United States vs Cambodia
 - invasion in 1970
10. United States vs Iraq
 - war in 1990-91
11. Japan vs China
 - war in 1894-95
 - Boxer Rebellion in 1900
 - Manchurian war in 1931-33
 - Marco Polo bridge war in 1937-41
 - World War II
12. Japan vs Soviet Union/Russia
 - Russo-Japanese war in 1903-05
 - Chankufeng war in 1938
13. Japan vs Mongolia
 - Nomohan war in 1939
14. Japan vs Germany
 - WW1
15. Japan vs Great Britain
 - WW2
16. Japan vs Philippines
 - WW2
17. Japan vs Netherlands
 - WW2
18. Japan vs Australia
 - WW2
19. Japan vs Burma
 - WW2
20. Germany vs Soviet Union/Russia
 - WW1
 - WW2
21. Germany vs Great Britain
 - WW1
 - WW2
22. Germany vs France
 - WW1
 - WW2

23. Germany vs Belgium

- WW1
- WW2

24. Germany vs Poland

- WW2

25. Germany vs Denmark

- WW2

26. Germany vs Norway

- WW2

27. Germany vs Netherlands

- WW2

28. Germany vs Portugal

- WW1

29. Germany vs Luxembourg

- WW2

30. Germany vs Serbia (Yugoslavia)

- WW1
- WW2

31. Germany vs Greece

- WW2

32. Germany vs Australia

- WW2

33. Germany vs New Zealand

- WW2

34. Germany vs Canada

- WW2

35. Germany vs Romania

- WW1

36. France vs Thailand

- war in 1893

- war in 1940-41

37. France vs China

- Boxer Rebellion

38. France vs Soviet Union/Russia

- occupation in 1918-19

39. France vs Turkey

- French occupation of Cilicia in 1919-21

40. France vs Egypt

- war in 1956

41. France vs Iraq

- war in 1990-91

42. Great Britain vs China

- Boxer Rebellion in 1900
- Korean War

43. Great Britain vs Turkey

- WW1

44. Great Britain vs Soviet Union/Russia

- occupation in 1918-19

45. Great Britain vs Italy

- WW2

46. Great Britain vs North Korea

- Korean War

47. Great Britain vs Egypt

- war in 1956

48. Great Britain vs Argentina

- war in 1982

49. Great Britain vs Iraq

- WW2
- war in 1990-91

50. China vs Soviet Union/Russia
 - Boxer Rebellion in 1900
 - Occupation of Manchuria by Russia in 1900
 - China East Railway dispute in 1929
51. China vs South Korea
 - Korean War
52. China vs Canada
 - Korean War
53. China vs Turkey
 - Korean War
54. China vs India
 - war in 1961-62
55. China vs Vietnam
 - war in 1978-79
 - war in 1986-87
56. Soviet Union/Russia vs Austria(-Hungary)
 - WW1
57. Soviet Union/Russia vs Turkey
 - WW1
58. Soviet Union/Russia vs Poland
 - war in 1919-20
59. Soviet Union/Russia vs Finland
 - war in 1939-40
60. Soviet Union/Russia vs Hungary
 - invasion in 1956
61. India vs Pakistan
 - war in 1947-49
 - war in 1965
 - Bangladesh war in 1971
62. Turkey vs Greece
 - war in 1897-98
 - first Balkan war in 1912-13
 - World War I
 - war in 1919-20
 - Cyprus war in 1974
63. Turkey vs Bulgaria
 - first Balkan war in 1912-13
 - second Balkan war in 1913
64. Turkey vs Serbia (Yugoslavia)
 - first Balkan war in 1912-13
65. Turkey vs Australia
 - WW1
66. Turkey vs New Zealand
 - WW1
67. Bulgaria vs Serbia (Yugoslavia)
 - second Balkan war in 1913
 - WW1
68. Bulgaria vs Romania
 - second Balkan war in 1913
69. Bulgaria vs Greece
 - second Balkan war in 1913
 - WW1
70. Czechoslovakia vs Hungary
 - war in 1919
71. Hungary vs Romania
 - war in 1919
72. Romania vs Austria(-Hungary)
 - WW1
73. Austria(-Hungary) vs Serbia
 - WW1
74. Spain vs Morocco
 - war in 1909-10

- 75. Poland vs Lithuania
 - Lithuanian war of independence in 1920
- 76. Italy vs Turkey
 - war in 1911
- 77. Italy vs Ethiopia
 - Ethiopian war for independence in 1934-36
- 78. Italy vs Austria(-Hungary)
 - WW1
- 79. Italy vs Greece
 - WW2
- 80. Italy vs South Africa
 - WW2
- 81. Italy vs Iraq
 - war in 1990-91
- 82. Armenia vs Azerbaijan
 - war in 1991-
- 83. Israel vs Egypt
 - war in 1948
 - war in 1956
 - war in 1967
 - war of attrition in 1967-70
 - war in 1973
- 84. Israel vs Syria
 - war in 1948
 - war in 1967
 - war in 1973
 - conflict in 1980-82
- 85. Israel vs Jordan
 - war in 1948
 - war in 1956
 - war in 1967
 - war of attrition in 1967-70
- war in 1973
- 86. Israel vs Lebanon
 - war in 1948
- 87. Israel vs Saudi Arabia
 - war in 1973
- 88. Israel vs Iraq
 - war in 1948
 - war in 1973
- 89. Iran vs Iraq
 - war in 1980-88
- 90. Iraq vs Syria
 - war in 1990-91
- 91. Iraq vs Saudi Arabia
 - war in 1990-91
- 92. Iraq vs Canada
 - war in 1990-91
- 93. Iraq vs Egypt
 - war in 1990-91
- 94. Ethiopia vs Somalia
 - war in 1977-78
- 95. Somalia vs Cuba
 - war in 1977-78
- 96. Uganda vs Tanzania
 - war in 1978-79
- 97. Tanzania vs Libya
 - war in 1978-79
- 98. Bolivia vs Paraguay
 - Chaco war in 1931-35
- 99. Guatemala vs Honduras

- war in 1906

100. Guatemala vs El Salvador

- war in 1906

101. Nicaragua vs Honduras

- war in 1907

102. Honduras vs El Salvador

- war in 1969

103. North Vietnam vs South
Vietnam

- Vietnam War

104. North Vietnam vs Australia

- Vietnam War

105. North Vietnam vs New Zealand

- Vietnam War

106. North Vietnam vs Philippines

- Vietnam War

107. North Vietnam vs South Korea

- Vietnam War

108. North Vietnam vs Thailand

- Vietnam War

109. South Vietnam vs Laos

- offensive in Laos

110. South Vietnam vs Cambodia

- offensive in Cambodia

111. Vietnam vs Cambodia

- war in 1975-79

112. South Korea vs North Korea

- Korean War

113. North Korea vs Canada

- Korean War

114. North Korea vs Turkey

- Korean War

APPENDIX C

Coding of Reconciliation Events

Dyad	War # Reconciled (Y/N/P)	Date
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France - Thailand October, 1893	01	Y
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Notes/Cites: See Virginia Thompson, Thailand: The New Siam (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corporation, 1967), p. 189; David K. Wyatt, Thailand - A Short History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 204.

China - Japan April, 1895	02	Y
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Notes/Cites: Senior representatives of each government met in Japan to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki. See Jeffrey Dorwart, The Pigtail War: American Involvement in the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895 (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1975), pp. 85-86; See Denis Twitchett, ed., The Cambridge History of China, v.2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 108.

Spain - USA April, 1899	04	N
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Notes/Cites: Representatives of senior officials from both governments worked to draft the Treaty of Paris, which was later ratified by the respective legislatures. See Joseph Smith, The Spanish - American War: Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific (New York: Longman Publishing, 1994), pp. 200, 208.

China - USA January, 1901	05	Y
China - UK January, 1901	05	Y
China - Japan January, 1901	05	Y
China - France	05	Y

January, 1901		
China - Germany	05	Y
January, 1901		
China - Russia	05	Y
January, 1901		

Notes/Cites: See William J. Duiker, Cultures in Collision - The Boxer Rebellion (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), pp. 192-195; Christopher Martin, The Boxer Rebellion (New York: Abelard, Schuman Limited, 1968), pp. 210-211; Chester Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New York: Octagon Books Inc., 1967), pp. 184-186.

China - Russia	06	Y? -official died
March, 1902		

Notes/Cites: See Denis Twitchett, ed., The Cambridge History of China, v.2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 128-129.

Russia - Japan	07	Y
August, 1905		

Notes/Cites: Aided by American mediation, senior representatives from each government met in Portsmouth, New Hampshire to work toward a peace agreement. The Treaty of Portsmouth brought an end to the conflict. See Richard Hough, The Fleet That Had to Die (New York: Viking Press Inc., 1958), pp. 204-205; See Peter Duus, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, v.6 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 226.

Nicaragua - Honduras	08	Y
December, 1907		

Notes/Cites: Ministers and representatives from all involved Central American states, the US, and Mexico met in Washington at the Central American Conference. The Treaty of Peace and Amity resulted. See William S. Robertson, History of the Latin-American Nations (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1932) pp. 614-615.

Honduras - El Salvador	09	Y
December, 1907		
Nicaragua - El Salvador	09	Y
December, 1907		

Notes/Cites: Ministers and representatives from all involved Central American states, the US, and Mexico met in Washington at the Central American Conference. The Treaty of Peace and Amity resulted. See William S. Robertson, History of the Latin-American Nations (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1932), pp. 614-615.

Spain - Morocco	10	Y
November, 1909		

Notes/Cites: See Edmund Burke, Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Pre-Colonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 145-146.

Italy - Turkey	11	? - Turkey forced?
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Notes/Cites: See Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy, From Liberalism to Fascism, 1870-1925 (London, England: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1967), pp. 378-379.

Bulgaria - Turkey	12	Y? -Turkey
forced? May, 1913		
Greece - Turkey	12	Y?
May, 1913		
Yugoslavia - Turkey	12	Y?
May, 1913		

Notes/Cites: After an armistice in December, 1912, a conference of ambassadors met in London to finalize a peace treaty. The Treaty of London was the result. See Alan Palmer, The Lands Between (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1970), pp. 114-115; See Leslie Tihany, A History of Middle Europe (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976), pp. 185-186.

Bulgaria - Yugoslavia	13	Y
August, 1913		
Bulgaria - Turkey	13	Y
August, 1913		
Bulgaria - Greece	13	Y
August, 1913		
Bulgaria - Romania	13	Y

August, 1913

Notes/Cites: See Leslie C. Tihany, A History of Middle Europe (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976), pp. 185-186; See Alan Palmer, The Lands Between (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1970), pp. 114-115.

Necessary Conditions For Participation in **World War I** Conflict:

* Participants must, of their own free will, have declared war upon other countries.

* Countries must have submitted military troops for participation in battle-like activity.

<u>Dyad</u>	<u>War #</u>	<u>Reconciled (Y/N/P)</u>	<u>Date</u>
Germany-USA	14	Y	
August, 1921			
Germany-UK	14	Y	
June, 1919			
Germany-France	14	Y	
June, 1919			
Germany-Japan	14	Y	
June, 1919			
Germany-Italy	14	Y	
June, 1919			
Germany - Rumania	14	Y	
June, 1919			
Germany-Russia	14	Y	
March, 1918			
Austria-USA	14	Y	
August, 1921			
Austria-UK	14	Y	
September, 1919			
Austria-France	14	Y	
September, 1919			
Austria-Japan	14	Y	
September, 1919			
Austria - Rumania	14	Y	
September, 1919			
Austria-Italy	14	Y	
September, 1919			
Bulgaria-UK	14	Y	

November, 1919		
Bulgaria-France	14	Y
November, 1919		
Bulgaria-Japan	14	Y
November, 1919		
Bulgaria-Italy	14	Y
November, 1919		
Bulgaria- Rumania	14	Y
November, 1919		
Hungary-USA	14	Y
August, 1921		
Hungary-UK	14	Y
June, 1920		
Hungary-France	14	Y
June, 1920		
Hungary-Japan	14	Y
June, 1920		
Hungary - Italy	14	Y
June, 1920		

Notes/Cites: See Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War (New York: Doubleday Books, 1995), pp.285-290; Sara Moore, Peace Without Victory for the Allies (Providence, RI: Berg Publishers, 1994), pp.125-127; Alan Sharp, The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919 (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1991), pp. 11, 38-41.

Hungary - Romania	15	Y
August, 1920		
Hungary - Czechoslovakia	15	Y
August, 1920		

Peace Treaty signed by representatives of each government at Little Trianon Castle, near Paris. Notes/Cites: See Ferenc Erdei, Information Hungary (Budapest, Hungary: Akademia Kiado, 1968), p. 274.

Soviet Union - Poland	16	Y
April, 1921		

Notes/Cites: See Konrad Syrop, Poland: Between the Hammer and the Anvil (London, England: Robert Hale Limited, 1968), p.112.

Greece - Turkey	18	Y
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August, 1920

Notes/Cites: The Turkish Sultan met with European leaders (Greece acting as a surrogate power for Western nations through this conflict) and signed The Treaty of Sevres. See Feroz, Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (New York: Routledge Publishers, 1993), pp. 47-48; Emin Lengyel, Turkey (New York: Random House Publishers, 1941), pp. 377-378..

Lithuania - Poland 19 N

Notes/Cites: See Alfred Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question, 1920-28 (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, Inc., 1966), pp. 232-234; See David M. Crowe, The Baltic States and the Great Powers (Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., 1993), pp. 5-7; Malibone W. Graham, New Governments of Eastern Europe (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1927), pp. 381-382.

China - Soviet Union 20 Y
December, 1929

Notes/Cites: In Khabarovsk, Russia, senior officials from China and the Soviet Union signed a protocol, ending the dispute. See Raymond L. Garthoff, Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York: Frederick Praeger, Inc., 1966), p. 24; Aitchen K. Wu, China and the Soviet Union (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press Inc., 1967), pp. 210-211.

Bolivia - Paraguay 22 P
July, 1938

Notes/Cites: Treaty signed by senior officials from both governments, meeting in Asuncion, possessed both public agreements and secret agreements (involving territory and protocol). See Leslie B. Rout, Politics of the Chaco Peace Conference, 1935-1939 (Austin TX: University of Texas Press, 1970), pp.201-204.

Ethiopia - Italy 23 N

Notes/Cites: See "A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974," by Zewde, Bahru, pp.158-160, Ohio University Press, Athens, OH. 1991.; See Chris Prouty, "Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow

Press Inc., 1981) pp.103-104.

China - Japan 24 N

Notes/Cites: Marco Polo Bridge incident escalated, later merging with the bases of World War II. See Marius B. Jansen, Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894-1972 (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally College Publishing, 1975)pp. 393-395, 425-427.

China - Soviet Union 25 Y
August, 1938

Notes/Cites: See Michael T. Kikuoka, The Changkufeng Incident: A Study in Soviet - Japanese Conflict (Lanham, MD:University Press of America, 1988), pp. 133, 144-148; See Alvin D. Coox, The Anatomy of a Small War: The Soviet - Japanese Struggle for Changkufeng - Khasan, 1938 (Greenwood, CT, 1977), pp.307-308.

Finland - Soviet Union 27 Y
March, 1940

Notes/Cites: The Treaty ending the conflict was signed at the Kremlin by senior officials of both governments. See Yohanan Cohen, Small Nations in Times of Crisis and Cooperation (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), p.316.

Necessary Conditions For Participation in **World War II** Conflict:
* Participants must, of their own free will, have declared war upon other countries.
* Countries must have submitted military troops for participation in battle-like activity.

Dyad	War #	Reconciled (Y/N/P) Date
US - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
UK - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
USSR - Italy	28	Y

September, 1943		
China - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
France - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
Australia - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
Belgium - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
Brazil - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
Canada - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
Czechoslovakia - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
Ethiopia - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
Greece - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
India - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
Netherlands - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
New Zealand - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
Poland - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
South Africa - Italy	28	Y
September, 1943		
US - Bulgaria	28	Y
February, 1947		
UK - Bulgaria	28	Y
February, 1947		
USSR - Bulgaria	28	Y
February, 1947		
Australia - Bulgaria	28	Y
February, 1947		
Czechoslovakia - Bulgaria	28	Y
February, 1947		
Greece - Bulgaria	28	Y
February, 1947		
India - Bulgaria	28	Y
February, 1947		
New Zealand - Bulgaria	28	Y
February, 1947		

South Africa- Bulgaria	28	Y
February, 1947		
Yugoslavia - Bulgaria	28	Y
February, 1947		
US - Hungary	28	Y
February, 1947		
UK - Hungary	28	Y
February, 1947		
USSR - Hungary	28	Y
February, 1947		
Australia - Hungary	28	Y
February, 1947		
Canada - Hungary	28	Y
February, 1947		
Czechoslovakia - Hungary	28	Y
February, 1947		
India - Hungary	28	Y
February, 1947		
New Zealand - Hungary	28	Y
February, 1947		
South Africa - Hungary	28	Y
February, 1947		
Yugoslavia - Hungary	28	Y
February, 1947		
UK - Finland	28	Y
February, 1947		
USSR - Finland	28	Y
February, 1947		
Australia - Finland	28	Y
February, 1947		
Canada - Finland	28	Y
February, 1947		
Czechoslovakia - Finland	28	Y
February, 1947		
India - Finland	28	Y
February, 1947		
New Zealand - Finland	28	Y
February, 1947		
US - Rumania	28	Y
February, 1947		
UK - Rumania	28	Y
February, 1947		
USSR - Rumania	28	Y
February, 1947		

Australia - Rumania	28	Y	
February, 1947			
Canada - Rumania	28	Y	
February, 1947			
Czechoslovakia - Rumania	28	Y	
February, 1947			
India - Rumania	28	Y	
February, 1947			
South Africa - Rumania	28	Y	
February, 1947			
New Zealand - Rumania	28	Y	
February, 1947			
US - Japan	28	Y	
April, 1952			
UK - Japan	28	Y	
April, 1952			
China - Japan	28	Y	
?Feb - April 1952			
India - Japan	28	Y	
?Feb - April 1952			
France - Japan	28	Y	
April, 1952			
Australia - Japan	28	Y	
April, 1952			
Greece - Japan	28	Y	
April, 1952			
New Zealand - Japan	28	Y	
April, 1952			
South Africa - Japan	28	Y	
April, 1952			
US - Germany	28	Y	
May 8, 1945			
USSR - Germany	28	Y	
May 8, 1945			
UK - Germany	28	Y	
May 8, 1945			
France - Germany	28	Y	May 8,
1945			

Note: Reconciliation occurred with Germany through a surrender agreement, with senior representatives of the four major Allies meeting with executive German representatives for an official signing ceremony. Through this ceremony, reconciliation was officially implied to settle conflicts between Germany and all Allied forces.

Notes/Cites: See Amelia C. Leiss, et. al., ed., European Peace Treaties After World War II (Worcester, MA: Commonwealth Press, 1954), pp. 163, 250, 251, 272, 273, 297, 298, 321, 322, 341; Redvers, Opie, The Search For Peace Settlements (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1951), p. 179; F.P. King, The New Internationalism: Allied Policy and the European Peace 1939-1945 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1973), pp. 48-51, 58-59, 76-77; Louis L. Snyder, The War: A Concise History, 1939-1945 (New York: Julian Mesner, 1960), pp. 440-443, 528-529.

France - Thailand	29	?
March, 1941		

India-Pakistan	30	N
N/A(See above)		

Notes/Cites: See #41 above.

Israel-Egypt	31	Y
September, 1978		
Israel-Iraq	31	N
Israel-Jordan	31	Y
October, 1994		
Israel-Lebanon	31	N
Israel-Syria	31	N

Notes/Cites: See #42 above. Regarding Lebanon, only brief cease fire in 1993, 1996. See Mariam Shahin, "Ending the Pain," Maclean's, v. 109, n. 19, May 6, 1996, pp.26-27; "The Guns Stop, Not the Anger," Economist, v.339, n. 7964, May 4, 1996, p.44.

USA-Korea	32	N
N.Korea-S.Korea	32	N

Notes/Cites: Agreement in 1994 between U.S.-DPRK on nuclear program. Some working level exchanges in 1992-93. Regarding North-South Korea, some exchanges in 1990-92 as high as Prime Minister. See Winston Lord, "U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," U.S. Department of State Dispatch, v. 7, n. 14, April 1, 1999, pp. 165-68; Mel Gurtov, "South Korea's Foreign Policy and Future Security: Implications of the Nuclear Standoff," Pacific Affairs, v. 69, n. 1, Spring

1996, pp.8-31.

Israel-Egypt	33	Y
September, 1978		
U.K.-Egypt	33	N
France-Egypt	33	N

Notes/Cites: See #42 above. Nothing conclusive in UK-Egypt or French-Egyptian relations. UN solution to Suez, no formal declaration of war or rapprochement. Informally, ties between Egypt and West improve after 1978.

Hungary-Soviet Union	34	N(?)
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Notes/Cites: 1956, Prime Minister Imre Nagy removed by invading Soviet forces, 1957 Janos Kadar installed, supports pro-Soviet line. Agrees to "temporary" installation of Soviet forces in Hungary. 1958, Nagy is hanged. Kadar is ousted in 1988. Democratic government elected in 1990. See Odd Arne Westad, Sven Holtsmark, and Iver B. Neumann eds., The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-89 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Richard F. Staar, ed., East-Central Europe and the USSR (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

China-India	35	Y
December, 1988		

Notes/Cites: December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi visits Beijing, Li Peng returns trip in 1991, pace of rapprochement increases in early 1990s. E.g., troop reductions on border, confidence-building steps. See Sandy Gordon, "South Asia after the Cold War: Winners and Losers," Asian Survey, v. 35, n. 10, October 1995, pp. 879-895; Wang Hong Yu, "Sino-Indian Relations: Present and Future," Asian Survey, v. 35, n. 6, June 1995, pp. 546-54; Mohan J. Malik, "China-India Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: The Continuing Rivalry," China Quarterly, n. 142, June 1995, pp. 317-55.

USA-Vietnam	36	Y
July, 1995		

Notes/Cites: See Winston Lord, "A New Phase in U.S.-Vietnam

Relations,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, v. 6, n. 28, July 10, 1995, pp.555-56; BrantlyWomack, “Vietnam in 1995: Success in Peace,” Asian Survey, v. 36, n. 1, January 1996, pp.73-82; Warren Christopher, “The U.S. and Vietnam: Establishing Diplomatic Relations,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, v. 6, n. 33, August 14, 1995, pp.629-32.

India-Pakistan	37	N
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Notes/Cites: See #41 above.

Israel-Egypt	38	Y
September, 1978		
Israel-Jordan	38	Y
October, 1994		
Israel-Syria	38	N

Notes/Cites: See #42

Egypt-israel	39	Y
September, 1978		

Notes/Cites: See #42

Honduras-El Salvador	40	Y
October, 1980		

Notes/Cites: Hostilities resume in 1976. On October 30, 1980 respective secretaries of state meet in Lima, Peru and publicly sign a peace treaty to resolve their territorial disputes. In 1986, the countries agree to submit their border dispute to the International Court of Justice. A Court decision is rendered in 1992. See “Honduras, El Salvador Settle Border Dispute--World Court Decides Contested Area,” Facts on File World Digest, September 24, 1992, p.709 A2; “Honduras, El Salvador Ties Restored,” Facts on File World Digest, November 14, 1980, p. 872 C3.

Pakistan-India	41	N
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Notes/Cites: see George Perkovich, “India, Pakistan, and the United States: The Zero-Sum Game,” World Policy Journal, v. 13, n. 2, Summer 1996, pp.49-55.

Israel-Jordan	42	Y
October, 1994		
Israel-Egypt	42	Y
September, 1978		
Israel-Saudi Arabia	42	N
Israel-Syria	42	N
Israel-Iraq	42	N

Notes/Cites: See Al Jarbawi, "The Triangle of Conflict," Foreign Policy, no.100, Fall 1995, pp.92-108; Bruce W. Nelson, "Waiting for the Holdout," Time, v. 144, n.6, August 8, 1991, pp.42-43; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam Books, 1982).

Turkey-Cyprus	43	N
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Notes/Cites: See Celestine Bohlen, "Dividing Line Freezes Mutual Fears in Cyprus," The New York Times, August 19, 1996, p.A2.

Vietnam-Cambodia	44	P
October, 1991		

Notes/Cites: In August 1989, Vietnamese officials meet face-to-face with representatives of Cambodia's factions (Sihanouk, Sun Sen, And Khmer Rouge), no agreement. Vietnam voluntarily withdraws troops from Cambodia in 1989. In 1991, Paris Peace accord Phase I agreed to by warring parties, election held. Khmer Rouge faction withdraws from peace accord, resumes armed struggle. Sihanouk elected, sharing power with Sun Sen (Vietnam's supported faction leader). See "Sihanouk Becomes King of Cambodia--Sun to Lead Government," Facts on File World Digest, September 30, 1993, p.475 E1; "Factions Agree to Partially Disarm," Facts on File World Digest, September 26, 1991, p.793 A1; "Vietnam Announces Cambodia Exit Date--Troops to be Pulled Out by September," Facts on File World Digest, April 7, 1989, p.231 D1; "Cambodia Factions Meet Face-to-Face, Talks Held in Indonesia," Facts on File World Digest, August 5, 1989, p.567 D2.

Ethiopia-Somalia	45	Y
April, 1988		

Notes/Cites: January 18-19, 1986 Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile

Mariam and Somalia's Said Barre meet in Djibouti. Negotiations final in April 1988 with a peace treaty, withdrawal of forces, and agreement to repair diplomatic relations. See Jeffrey A. LeFebvre, Arms for the Horn (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), pp.245-47.

Uganda-Tanzania	46	Y
February, 1981		

Notes/Cites: Overthrow of Amin regime by Tanzanian supported rebels. By May 1990, former President Obote returns from exile in Tanzania and is elected President. In February 1981, regional leaders in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania meet to agree to revitalize regional cooperation. See Robert I. Rotberg, Africa in the 1990's and Beyond (Ann Arbor, MI: World Peace Foundation 1988); Arthur S. Banks, Alan J. Day and Thomas C. Muller, Political Handbook of the World (Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications, 1996).

China-Vietnam	47	Y
October, 1991		

Notes/Cites: See #51

Syria-Israel	48	N
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Notes/Cites: See "Syria: Keep Your Distance," Economist, v. 338, n. 7951, Feb. 3, 1996, p.34; Stanley K. Sheinbaum, "Bring Assad Into the Fold," New Perspectives Quarterly, v. 131, n. 1, Winter 1996, p.72.

Iran-Iraq	49	N
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Notes/Cites: See "Allies in Adversity," Economist, v. 335, n. 7918, June 10, 1995, p.15; Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs, v. 73, n.2, March 1994, pp.44-55.

U.K.-Argentina	50	Y
March, 1990		

Notes/Cites: UN meetings, Madrid meetings; diplomatic exchange reestablished, will peacefully resolve territorial dispute. Sovereignty issue not yet resolved. See "The Falkland-Ending the Affair," Economist, v.

313, n. 7626, October 28, 1989, p.39; “Best of Friends Again Almost,” Economist, v. 319, n. 7711, June 15, 1991, p.30.

China-Vietnam	51	Y
October, 1991		

Notes/Cites: 1991 Summit of premiers leads to 11-pt. communique normalizing relations. “America and Asia: New Friends, New Enemies,” Economist, v. 336, n. 7923, July 5, 1995, p.24; Carlyle A. Thayer, “Sino-Vietnamese Relations,” Asian Survey, v. 34, n. 6, June 1994, pp.513-28; Brantly Womack, “Sino-Vietnamese Border Trade,” Asian Survey, v. 34, n. 6, June 1994, pp.495-512.

Iraq-USA	52	N
Iraq-UK	52	N
Iraq-Syria	52	N
Iraq-Saudi Arabia	52	N
Iraq-Canada	52	N
Iraq-Egypt	52	N
Iraq-France	52	N
Iraq-Italy	52	N

Notes/Cites: See Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of the Modern War, vol. 4: The Gulf War (Boulder: Westview, 1996); Peter Reuilherade, “Optimism From Baghdad,” Middle East, n. 243, March 1995, pp.26-27; Avner Gidron, “The Road to Damascus,” World Press Review, v. 40, n. 12, December 1993, p.35.

Armenia-Azerbaijan	53	N
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Notes/Cites: See “A Fearful Calm in the Caucasus,” Economist, v. 337, n. 7940, Nov.11, 1995; “Russia’s Caucasian Cauldron,” Economist, v. 332, no. 7875, August 6, 1994, pp.34-40; Steven Shabad, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Obstacles to Peace,” World Press Review, v. 41, no. 3, March 1994, p.35.

and struggles that led to regime overthrows (Nicaragua in the 1970s and South Africa in the apartheid era).

2

The notion of international society (or society of states) we take from Hedley Bull (1977, p.13). According to Bull, international society "exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the workings of common institutions."

3

It is worth noting that this question dovetails with recent work on rivalries and, in particular, rivalry termination (Goertz and Diehl, 1993; Thompson, 1995; Bennett, 1996; Bennett, 1997a; Bennett, 1997b, Bercovitch and Diehl, 1997; and Gibler, 1997) in that reconciliation is one form or pathway of rivalry termination.

4

The Goldstein scale contains numeric values for 61 WEIS events. The version of WEIS we received in the Fall of 1996 contains 63 events. The two new events are 022 [COM2] Pessimistic comment on situation and 024 [COM4] Optimistic comment on situation. We gave event 022 a value of -0.5 and event 024 a value of 0.5.

5

The source code for the FORTRAN programs can be found on the Web site for Brecke (<http://www.inta.gatech.edu/peter/reconcile.html>).

6

There are, in our estimation, two possible explanations for cases with insufficient data to generate a post-reconciliation graph. First, cooperative events are not reported as much in the media as are conflictual events, and thus they are relatively poorly represented in the datasets, particularly COPDAB and WEIS. Improvements in the relations between countries manifested in trade or other business agreements, for example, often do not pass the threshold of "newsworthiness" for a newspaper such as *The New York Times* and as a result are not reported. If these events are not reported, an improvement in relations will not appear in the time series plots. This is particularly problematic for WEIS because it is based almost exclusively on *The New York Times*, and international coverage, especially of events like trade deals in Africa, by *The New York Times* has been declining in recent years (Tomlinson, personal communication in 1996). Second, the datasets, especially COPDAB and WEIS, suffer from unevenness in their coverage of different parts of the world, which results in a lack of reported events for certain dyads even though there was almost certainly interaction. For a number of dyads that experienced a reconciliation in the 1948-1992 time frame such as Tanzania and Uganda in 1981, there simply were not enough reported events, hostile or cooperative, between the countries such that one could assert relations had changed.

The second type of analysis consists of performing interrupted time-series analysis on the dyadic flows with reconciliation events being an intervention that "interrupts" a time series (McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger, and Hay, 1980). Specifically, if time-series estimation for individual dyads with an intervention representing a reconciliation event results in a better statistical fit than estimation of those same dyads without the intervention being represented, and if the mean value for the relationship following the reconciliation event is higher than it was before the reconciliation, that finding would support hypothesis 1. Obviously, this finding would need to occur for a high proportion of the dyads with reconciliation events for this form of analysis to be evidence for hypothesis 1.

The third type of analysis is to perform analysis of variance with the non-reconciliation dyads serving as one subsample and the dyads with reconciliation serving as the other subsample. If there is a difference between the non-reconciliation and reconciliation subsamples in their average increase between immediate post-conflict relations and relations at a later time (with that later time sufficiently long to enable all reconciliation events to be incorporated), and that the difference is such that the reconciliation subsample exhibits the larger increase, that would be evidence for hypothesis 3.

Similarly, hypothesis 2 can be tested by comparing the long-term pre-conflict mean value of a relationship against a comparable post-conflict mean value that begins sufficiently subsequent to the end of the conflict for reconciliation events to have taken place. If the subsample of reconciliation cases exhibits no difference compared to the non-reconciliation subsample, that is evidence supporting hypothesis 2.